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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
* 
Plaintiff/Appellee, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* 
v. * 
ANTONY DAVIS, * Case No. 20090816-SC 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Defendant filed a Motion for Funds in order to obtain a medical expert and a 
private investigator to adequately prepare his defense. The trial court denied the motion 
on September 22, 2009. This appeal is taken from Defendant's Motion for Funds, which 
was denied by the Honorable Judge Vernise Trease of the Third District Court. 
Jurisdiction to hear this case is conferred upon the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in requiring Defendant to show there was a 
compelling reason to require Salt Lake County to pay for a private 
investigator and medical expert? 
Standard of Review. The question of whether the compelling reason 
standard applies is a matter of statutory interpretation, and an appellate 
court must review a trial court's statutory interpretation for correctness. 
State v. Bums, 200 UT 56, f 15, 4 P.3d 795. 
2. Did the trial court err in requiring Defendant to be represented by LDA in 
order to qualify for receiving funding from Salt Lake County? 
Standard of Review. The question of whether a trial court can require a 
Defendant to accept LDA counsel in order to qualify for other state/county 
funded assistance for a private investigator or an expert is a matter of 
statutory interpretation, and an appellate court must review a trial court's 
statutory interpretation for correctness. State v. Burns, Id. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD PRESERVING ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
Defendant filed a Motion for Funds, asking the trial court to order Salt 
Lake County to provide him funds in order to hire a medical expert and a private 
investigator to prepare his defense. The trial court entered a ruling on that very 
issue. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The defendant identifies the following constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances and rules as those "whose interpretation is determinative" within the 
meaning of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6): 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or the indictment 
2 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
UTAH CONSTIUTION AMENDMENT VII 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
UTAH CONSTIUTION AMENDMENT XII 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel.. . 
RULE 15(a) UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The court may appoint any expert witness agreed upon by Ihe 
parties or of its own selection. An expert so appointed shall be informed of 
his duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed. An expert 
so appointed shall advise the court and the parties of his findings and may 
thereafter be called to testify by the court or by any party. He shall be 
subject to cross-examination by each party. He shall be subject to cross-
examination by each party. The court shall determine the reasonable 
compensation of the expert and direct payment thereof. The parties may 
call expert witnesses of their own at their own expense. Upon showing that 
a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose services 
are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he 
were called on behalf of the prosecution. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was charged with Rape of a Child and Aggravated Sex Abuse 
of a Child, first degree felonies. Defendant first appeared in court on January 
27, 2009, and the Court found him indigent and appointed an attorney from 
the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association (LDA) to represent him. Under 
the advice of his appointed counsel, Defendant waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing and an arraignment hearing was scheduled. The 
arraignment was held on March 27, 2009, and Defendant pleaded not-guilty 
and the case was set for trial for June 9, 2009. Defendant began to lose 
confidence in his appointed counsel since he continuously requested he take a 
polygraph examination and questioned his claims of innocence. TCFF TJ5. 
As such, his family retained private counsel, Sean B. Druyon, on May 13, 
2009. TCFF, %4. His new counsel recommended a medical expert and a 
private investigator to aid in the Defendant's defense. However, Defendant 
remained indigent and all funds from the family had been depleted. As such, 
Defendant filed a Motion for Funds on June 19, 2009. TCFF ^|4. Defendant's 
Motion for Funds was heard on August 18, 2009, but was denied. At that 
hearing, Defendant was not prepared to address the compelling reason 
standard since he did not think it applied because he was not seeking for an 
order requiring Salt Lake County or Legal Defender's Association to provide 
funds for non-contracting defense resources under Utah Code §77-32-302(e). 
HT, p. 20, lines 14-15. Defendant asked the court under the Indigent Defense 
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Act to order LDA to provide the experts he requested. Notwithstanding Utah 
Code § 77-32-302(2)(b), the trial court found it did not have a legal basis for 
ordering LDA to do anything since LDA had a contract with Salt Lake 
County, and that Salt Lake County was required, by statute, to provide 
defense resources to indigent defendants. TCCL ]f4. The trial court also 
found that Defendant had failed to state a compelling reason under Utah Code 
§ 77-32-302 (2)(e). TCCL ^|2. The trial court found as a matter of law that 
unless Mr. Davis demonstrates a compelling reason, Salt Lake County would 
not be statutorily obligated to provide him with any defense resources. TCCL 
T|4. Defendant timely filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal the 
Interlocutory Order, of which this Court granted. 
ARGUMENTS 
OVERVIEW OF LEGAL STANDARDS 
The United States Constitution Requires that an Accused shall have the Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel which Includes Necessary Defense Resources in Order to Prepare 
a Complete Defense. 
The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. This means that 
"[c]ounsel must be furnished to an indigent defendant in federal court in every case, 
whatever the circumstances." Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 136-37, 67 S.Ct. 1716, 91 
L.Ed. 1955 (1947). The right to assistance of counsel for criminal defendants is a 
fundamental right of due process and thereby applicable to the states by way of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335, 339-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 
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9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The Utah Const. Amend. VII provides that "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Further Utah Const. 
Amend. XII states that "(i)n criminal prosecution the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend....by counsel...." Utah Const. Amen. XII. Furthermore, the United 
States Supreme Court has held in several cases that the Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process means that this right to counsel includes effective assistance of counsel. 
See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-97, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 
(1985)(effective assistance also applies at appellate level); Cuyler v. Sullivaa 446 U.S. 
335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (guarantee of effective assistance means 
indigents must be afforded adequate legal assistance); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89-
90, 76 S.Ct. 167, 100 L.Ed. 77 (1955) (assignment of counsel after indictment was not 
effective assistance of counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 
L.Ed. 158 (1932) (trial judge's general appointment of "all members of the bar" for 
arraignment and then failure to appoint counsel for trial was not effective assistance of 
counsel). 
In furtherance of this premise, the Supreme Court in Britt v. North Carolina held 
that as a matter of equal protection, a state must "provide indigent prisoners with the 
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to 
other prisoners." 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d400 (1971); see also Akev. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (holding that to 
provide effective defense, indigent defendants must have access to basic tools of 
defense). 
Utah's Indigent Defense Act is a Response to Gideon and its Progeny 
Utah's Indigent Defense Act is a response to Gideon and its progeny. In State v. 
Burns, 2000 Utah 56, 4 P.3d 795, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[i]t is this line of 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court that prompted states to implement acts 
such as the Utah Indigent Defense Act (the "Act") to ensure that the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel includes access for indigents to the basic tools of 
defense." I4at^|24. 
This Court has already Ruled that the Utah Indigent Defense Act only Requires an 
Indigent Defendant to Establish Indigency and Necessity in Order to Qualify for 
County Funds. 
A defendant seeking county funds for obtaining legal counsel and necessary 
defense resources need only demonstrate indigency and necessity. Burns, supra, at TJ32. 
Burns is a case very similar to the present case. In Burns, defendant was initially 
appointed counsel due to indigency. Later Burns's father retained private counsel for her 
and they motioned the court for an expert since her father did not have the financial 
resources to retain the expert. The trial court denied her motion for an expert, ruling that 
she was required to have LDA counsel, not private counsel, in order to qualify for this 
assistance. In that case, Defendant's motion for appointment of expert was heaird on 
April 10, 1992. At that time, the Act provided: 
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The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, city 
and town for the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts 
and various administrative bodies of the state: 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of his liberty; 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete 
defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of other 
remedies before or after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel 
to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent discretionary 
appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990) (enacted by Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 15, 
§ 2, 1980 Utah Laws 110, 209 (amended 1983)) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 77-
32-301 (Supp. 1999)). In addition, the Act provided that the 
[g]overning bodies of counties, cities and towns shall either: 
(1) Authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this chapter by 
appointing a qualified attorney in each case and awarding him reasonable 
compensation and expenses to be paid by the appropriate governing body; 
or 
(2) Arrange to provide those services through non-profit legal aid or other 
associations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-6 (1990) (enacted by Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 15, 
§ 2, 1980 Utah Laws 110, 209) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-306 (Supp. 
1999)). Thus, § 77-32-1 separately listed five requirements that were the minimum 
standards a county had to provide to an indigent defendant. Additionally, § 77-32-6 
allowed a county two options for providing those minimum standards. See 
also Washington County v. Day. 22 Utah 2d 6, 10, 447 P.2d 189, 192 (1968) (holding 
that section one obligates county to furnish minimum standards and section six provides 
two options for providing standards). 
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Burns argued that nothing in § 77-32-1 conditioned expert assistance on the 
appointment of state-funded counsel. The minimum standards available to an indigent 
defendant at that time were listed in § 77-32-1 as five discrete subsections. This was an 
indication that the right to counsel stood separate and distinct from the right to the 
"investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense." This Court held that 
it is clear from the plain language of that section that a county must 
"[p]rovide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete 
defense" to every indigent person, not just to those represented by the LDA. 
There is nothing in the section that conditions availability of these basic 
tools of defense on acceptance of LDA counsel. Instead, under the plain 
language of section 77-32-1, the only deciding factors of eligibility for this 
type of assistance are that the defendant in a criminal case be indigent and 
that the investigatory and other facilities be necessary to a complete 
defense. 
Id. at ^ j28. 
This Court went on to note that in interpreting statutes, a court's primary goal should be 
to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. See Evans v State, 
963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). We need look beyond the plain language 
only if we find some ambiguity. See id. "In analyzing a statute's plain 
language, we must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and 
independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms." V-l Oil Co. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 917 (Utah 1997). However, if we find a 
provision that causes doubt or uncertainty in its application, we must 
"analyze the act in its entirety and "harmonize its provisions in accordance 
with the legislative intent and purpose.'" Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge 
#7743,854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & 
Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)). Nevertheless, a statute's 
unambiguous language "may not be interpreted to contradict its plain 
meaning." Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asav.932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). 
The State argued, however, that § 77-32-6 should be read to provide that the 
"investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense" need be furnished to 
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an indigent defendant only if the LDA is representing that defendant. To resolve the 
State's contention, the court analyzed the Act in its entirety in an attempt to harmonize 
§ 77-32-6 and § 77-32-1 in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose of 
providing indigents with access to the basic tools of defense. In doing so, this Court noted 
that "the unambiguous language of § 77-32-1 may not be interpreted to contradict its 
plain meaning." Id. at f29. § 77-32-6 provided that a county may set up a nonprofit 
legal aid association to provide the minimum required services or authorize the court to 
appoint such services. However, this Court noted that: 
that section cannot be read to mandate the packaging of indigent assistance 
with LDA representation. To suggest, as the State does, that only those 
indigents represented by LDA are eligible for the minimum services would 
be a direct contradiction of the plain meaning of section 77-32-1 as well as 
the legislative purpose of providing indigents with the basic tools of 
defense. In fact, contrary to its argument, the State indicated at oral 
argument that an indigent defendant proceeding pro se who has declined 
standby counsel from the LDA would be able to acquire funding for expert 
assistance. See generally State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ffi[9, 35, 979 P.2d 
799 (indigent defendant refused LDA counsel and proceeded pro se but had 
independent expert witness to testify at hearing). 
Id. at Tffl 29-31. This Court also found persuasive Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure: 
" [u]pon showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an 
expert whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee 
shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of the prosecution." Utah 
R.Crim. P. 15(a). There is no indication in this rule that a defendant must be 
represented by LDA to qualify for this assistance. Instead, the only 
prerequisites for eligibility are financial inability to pay and necessity for an 
adequate defense. 
It follows, therefore, that the only requirements for receiving public 
assistance for expert witnesses are proof of necessity and establishment of 
indigence. 
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Id. at fflf 30-32 (footnotes eliminated). 
The Amended Utah Indigent Defense Act does not Change a Defendant's 
Constitutional Right to the Basic Tools for an Adequate Defense. 
Defendant/Appellant acknowledges that the Utah Indigent Defense Act has been 
amended since Burns. However, the amended Act still does not condition funding for 
necessary defense resources on having LDA representation; it simply now requires a 
Defendant to demonstrate a compelling reason if s/he either seeks funding for a non-
contracting attorney or for a non-contracting defense resource. This was reaffirmed in 
State v. Barber 206 P.3d 1223, (Utah Ct. App. 2009). In Barber, the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that a private attorney who failed to interview a medical expert because the 
defendant lacked the funds to hire this expert had failed the first prong of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel test and was, thus, deficient in his representation because he could 
have motioned the court for an order requiring Salt Lake County to pay for those funds 
under Rule 15 (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id, at ^ 20-21. Barber makes 
it clear that an indigent defendant need not have LDA representation in order to access 
funds for necessary defense resources. 
ARGUMENT I 
The Trial Court Misapplied the "Compelling Reason" Standard 
The trial court held that Defendant failed to establish that there were 
compelling reasons to justify ordering Salt Lake County to pay for defense 
resources for Defendant/Appellant and, consequently, denied Defendant's 
Motion for Funds. However, Defendant need not meet the compelling reason 
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standard unless he is seeking Salt Lake County to pay for either 1) his private 
counsel, or 2) a private investigator or medical expert that are outside those 
contracted for by LDA. In the present case, Defendant does not seek county 
funds to pay for his private counsel; nor does he seek county funds to pay for a 
private investigator or medical expert that he would not be entitled to should an 
LDA appointed attorney be representing him. 
Utah Code § 77-32-301 states the minimum standards for defense as 
an indigent: 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an 
indigent in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of 
the state in accordance with the following minimum standards: 
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty; 
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete 
defense; 
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; 
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and 
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by 
defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and 
subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
Utah Code § 77-32-301(emphasis added). 
It is clear that the Utah Indigent Defense Act requires Salt Lake County to 
provide, at a minimum, counsel as well as investigatory resources necessary for 
a complete defense. The trial court has already found Defendant/Appellant to 
be indigent and the indigency determination is not contested for the purposes of 
this appeal. The next inquiry should have been whether Defendant's requested 
resources are necessary for an adequate or complete defense. However, rather 
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than rule on this the trial court erroneously found that Defendant/Appellant had 
not met the compelling reason standard under Utah Code § 77-32-302 (b) and 
(e). See HT, p. 19, lines 6-8, and TCCL, ^]2. 
Utah Code § 77-32-302 (2)(b) and (e) state: 
(b) If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal 
defense of an indigent, including defense resources and counsel, has 
arranged by contract to provide those services through a legal aid 
association, and the court has received notice or a copy of the contract, the 
court shall assign the legal aid association named in the contract to 
defend the indigent and provide defense resources. ... 
(e) If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting 
attorney or defense resource to provide legal services to an indigent 
defendant despite the existence of an indigent legal services contract and 
the court has a copy or notice of the contract, before the court may make 
the assignment, it shall: 
(i) set the matter for a hearing; 
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible 
county or municipality; and 
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a 
noncontracting attorney or defense resource. 
Utah Code § 77-32-302 (2)(b) and (e)(emphasis added). See also 
Utah Code §77-32-3-3. 
Subsection (b) requires the Court to assign the Legal Defender's 
Association (LDA) to defend the indigent and provide defense resources if the 
County has a contract with LDA to provide these services. This was initially 
done when Defendant/Appellant was first arraigned. Subsequent to this, 
however, Defendant became dissatisfied with his appointed counsel and his 
family pooled resources and retained new counsel. The trial court then 
erroneously ruled that since Defendant/Appellant had private counsel, under 
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subsection (e), Defendant was required to demonstrate a compelling reason in 
order for the court to order Salt Lake County to pay for any defense resources 
Defendant/Appellant was asking for. 
In the present case Defendant/Appellant does not seek funding for a non-
contracting attorney or for a non-contracting defense resource. Defendant 
merely seeks to retain a private investigator and medical expert LDA would 
have used had they been representing him. Should one of these experts or 
investigators that is utilized by the LDA prove to not be adequate for Defendant 
to prepare a complete defense, then he will motion the court for such and 
demonstrate his compelling reasons at that time. But this is not anticipated at 
present and, until that happens, Utah Code § 77-32-302 (2)(e) or §77-32-303 do 
not apply to the case at bar. As such, the trial court incorrectly applied the 
"compelling reason" standard as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT II 
An Indigent Defendant is not Required to be 
Represented by LDA in Order to Have Access to 
Salt Lake County Funds for Experts and 
Investigators 
Nothing in Utah's Indigent Defense Act requires a defendant to be represented by 
LDA in order to have access to county funds for necessary defense resources. In fact, 
this very Court held in State v. Burns, 2000 Utah 56, 4 P.3d 795, that: 
Section 77-32-6 [the Utah Indigent Act—prior to its current version] 
provides that a county may set up a nonprofit legal aid association to 
provide the minimum required services or authorize the court to appoint 
such services. However, this section cannot be read to mandate the 
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packaging of indigent assistance with LDA representation. To suggest, 
as the State does, that only those indigents represented by LDA are 
eligible for the minimum services would be a direct contradiction of the 
plain meaning of section 77-32-1 as well as the legislative purpose of 
providing indigents with the basic tools of defense. In fact, contrary to 
its argument, the State indicated at oral argument that an indigent defendant 
proceeding pro se who has declined standby counsel from the LDA would 
be able to acquire funding for expert assistance. See generally State v. 
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ffi[9, 35, 979 P.2d 799 (indigent defendant refused 
LDA counsel and proceeded pro se but had independent expert witness to 
testify at hearing)(italics added on the term pro se, twice, and bold 
emphasis added). 
Burns, supra, at f 30. And, as discussed above, although the Utah Indigent Defense Act 
was amended post Burns, nothing in the amended Act specifically requires a defendant to 
have LDA in order to qualify for Salt Lake County funds for necessary defense resources. 
In fact, State v. Barber, supra, specifically held that a private attorney was deficient in his 
representation when he failed to seek funds for an expert since Rule 15 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure permit an indigent defendant to have such funding for necessary 
experts even when the defendant is being represented by private counsel. IdL at ^ 20-21. 
It is telling that the court did not make any requirement that defendant show compelling 
reasons to request an expert. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court was wrong in denying his Motion for Funds, Mr. 
Davis asks this Court reverse the trial court's order and find that the compelling 
reason standard does not apply since the Defendant/Appellant, Mr. Davis, is not 
seeking county funds for either a noncontracting attorney or a noncontracting defense 
resource. As such, Defendant respectfully requests this Court remand the case to the 
15 
trial court in order for Mr. Davis to demonstrate that his request for a private 
investigator and a medical doctor are necessary to a complete defense under the Sixth 
Amendment of the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
DATED this I p day of 2010. 
NATjADffi BRAEGGER 
FOR SEAN B. DRUYON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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1 case, that would be something that I think would be relevant 
2 for consideration of the Court. 
3 I So just so that I am clear on the record, although, 
4 Mr, Druyon you indicate at this hearing and in your reply that 
5 you are not requesting that the County directly pay for the 
6 resources, and therefore 302 — 77-32-302(e) is not relevant, 
7 I do want to make this statement for the record. That is, in 
8 regards to that section, we have had a hearing today. Notice 
9 was given to the County, and they replied, as well as Salt Lake 
10 Legal Defenders out of courtesy. That under the definition of 
11 what is a compelling reason, the defendant has not provided — 
12 MR. DRUYON: May I address that briefly? 
13 THE COURT: Sure. 
14 MR. DRUYON: Because I didn't think we would need to 
15 go into that, but let me just address that briefly. Mr. Davis 
16 represents that in the first few months of his incarceration 
17 and when these charges were filed, that he had a conflict of 
18 interest with the attorney that he was being represented by, 
19 in that the attorney met with him just — was it twice? 
20 MR. DAVIS: Once, I think. 
21 MR. DRUYON: — once, and during that discussion the 
22 defendant wanted to discuss with the attorney his defenses, 
23 and possible motives for the mother to coach the alleged victim 
24 daughter in this case. Those discussions were cut short, and 
25 Mr. Davis has represented to me — and I don't know if it's 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff, OF LAW AND ORDER REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR FUNDS 
vs. : 
ANTONY DAVIS, 
: Case No. 091900484 
Defendant. Judge Vernice Trease 
A hearing was held before the Honorable Judge Vernice Trease on August 18, 2009, at 
the hour of 2:00 P.M. Said hearing was on Defendant's MOTION FOR FUNDS. Deputy 
District Attorney Craig Wangsgard represented Salt Lake County. Sean B. Druyon represented 
defendant Antony Davis. Patrick Anderson represented Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association 
("LDA"). Based on proffers of Mr. Druyon, review of the pleadings and other good cause 
appearing, this Court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS: 
1. This Court has previously found Mr. Davis indigent. 
2. On June 8, 2009, Mr. Davis filed a Motion for Funds requesting LDA be ordered to 
pay for his expert witnesses or in the alternative find a compelling reason warranting 
Salt Lake County being ordered to pay for noncontracting defense resources. 
3. Although LDA was previously appointed to defend Mr. Davis, Mr. Davis chose to 
hire Mr. Druyon as his private counsel. 
4. Twenty-five days after filing Mr. Druyon's notice of appearance, Defendant filed his 
Motion for Funds. 
5. Mr. Druyon proffered that Mr. Davis' previously appointed Counsel requested a lie 
detector examination and failed to listen to Mr. Davis' claims of innocence, therefore 
Mr. Davis lost confidence in the LDA, 
6. Mr. Wangsgard on behalf of Salt Lake County and Mr. Anderson on behalf of LDA, 
consented to the admission of Mr. Druyon's proffers of evidence. 
7. Patrick Anderson, director, of LDA, stated that had Mr. Davis requested a different 
LDA attorney, he would have evaluated the alleged conflict and if warranted would 
have assigned a different attorney. 
8. If a legal conflict of interest existed, Mr. Anderson stated that LDA would have 
assigned Mr. Davis5 case to Conflict Counsel, as require by its contract with Salt 
Lake County. 
9. Legal Defenders Association is available to represent Mr. Davis and LDA has no 
2 
legal conflict of interest in this matter. 
10. LDA has the expertise and defense resources to provide an effective defense of Mr. 
Davis. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. Mr. Davis has failed to state a legal basis for ordering LDA to pay for his experts, 
2. Mr. Davis has failed to state a "compelling reason," as required by Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 77-32-302(2)(e), to appoint a noncontracting attorney or defense resource. 
3. Mr. Davis' preference for Mr. Druyon is not a compelling reason to warrant 
appointment of a noncontracting defense resource. 
4. Without a compelling reason, Salt Lake County is not statutorily obligated to provide 
Mr. Davis with non-contracting defense resources such as expert witnesses. 
ORDER 
1. Based on the findings of facts and conclusions of law as stated herein, Mr. Davis' 
Motion for Funds is hereby denied. 
DATED this day of , 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE VERNICE TREASE 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TOJORM 
con 
Sean B. Druyon, Attorney for Defendant 
APPROVEDASJCO FORM 
con 
Patrick Anderson, Attorney for LDA 
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